Introduction
The well-written works of the prolifĳic Damascene scholar, Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr al-Zurʿī, commonly known as Ibn Qayyim alJawziyya (d. 751/1350), which are far from being thoroughly researched and exhausted, represent the vibrant inner world of a scholar, whose wide range of interests covers law, speculative and moral theology, mysticism and poetry. Gaining his reputation mainly as the devoted disciple of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's works are fundamentally an interpretation of his master's legal and doctrinal work. Nevertheless, as the investigation of his works slowly progresses, it becomes evident that Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya developed his own taste while drawing from different sources of inspiration, not relying solely on his master's literary output. Ibn Ḥazm's thought, whose presence in the writings of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya is conspicuous, is one such source of inspiration.
Tracing the sometimes elusive reflection of Ibn Ḥazm's legacy in Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's works is a useful means to demonstrate his literary inclinations, which flourished independently in the margins of his theological thought, quite detached from the thought of his master. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya was not a typical scholar: carrying the torch of Ibn Taymiyya's controversial ideas, while being constantly persecuted and harrassed by his Shāfĳiʿī-Ashʿarite contemporaries, he cannot be regarded as representative of the majority of scholars in 14th century Damascus. Still, the depth of his acquaintance with the writings of Ibn Ḥazm can be considered indicative of the reception of Ḥazmian thought in Mamluk Damascus. It can also be the starting point of an investigation into Ibn Ḥazm's influence in the East.
The citations from Ibn Ḥazm's works in the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya are mentioned occasionally in modern research, © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-23424-6 without any attempt to systematically investigate and defĳine the later Ḥanbalīs' approach to Ibn Ḥazm, or the scope of his presence in their writings. In this respect, Henri Laoust's observations in his seminal work on Ibn Taymiyya are valuable leads and not substantial proofs. Based on his profound acquaintance with Ibn Taymiyya's works, Laoust determines that Ibn Taymiyya read Ibn Ḥazm's al-Faṣl fī l-milal wa-l-niḥal, although he gives no textual evidence to corroborate this statement.2 He also determines, again without providing any evidence, that Ibn Taymiyya studied the methodology of law from al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām, that he refuted every point in Kitāb al-ijmāʿ (by which he means Kitāb marātib al-ijmāʿ) and that he used al-Muḥallā for discussions in jurisprudence.3 These assertions, all correct, are confĳirmed, time and again, by the many references to these works in Ibn Taymiyya's writings.
What does Ibn Taymiyya think of Ibn Ḥazm? Three examples from the many references to Ibn Ḥazm in Ibn Taymiyya's works may illustrate that it is not so easy to answer this question. In some cases, Ibn Taymiyya supports Ibn Ḥazm's view, and does not hesitate to praise him for his erudition and vast knowledge. In the fĳirst example, quoting an anecdote about the Ashʿarite theologian Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) lying on his death-bed and repenting his lifetime occupation with kalām, Ibn Taymiyya seizes the opportunity to condemn al-Juwaynī for his poor knowledge of the traditionalist sources of law, and his unflattering view of them, since al-Juwaynī "thought that nothing in the Qurʾān, the Sunna and the consensus (ijmāʿ) points on the majority of cases (ḥawādith), and that analogy (qiyās) is the only means to use in order to make a ruling."4 Ibn Taymiyya adds: "Nevertheless, whosoever has any knowledge of the way the sacred texts allude to everyday cases knows, that what Abū Muḥammad Ibn Ḥazm and his like said, viz. that the sacred texts contain all the cases (al-nuṣūṣ tastawʿib jamīʿ al-ḥawādith) , is closer to the truth than [al-Juwaynī's] saying."5 This praise for Ibn Ḥazm and his like, however, is accompanied by Ibn Taymiyya's critique of their weak methods of drawing conclusions from the text, and deviating from the rulings of the Prophet's companions. Among these methods, Ibn Taymiyya mentions the 2 Laoust, Essai, p. 94. 3 Laoust, Essai, p. 105 . Ashʿarite contemporaries of Ibn Taymiyya attest to his acquaintance with Ibn Ḥazm's works and his debt to Ibn Ḥazm; see Bori, Ibn Taymiyya, pp. 40, 158. 4 Ibn Taymiyya, vol. 3, p. 169 (an interpretation of Q 7:172). 5 Ibid.
© 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-23424-6 manifest analogy (qiyās jalī) and the presumption of continuity (istiṣḥāb), the latter being fundamental to Ibn Ḥazm's jurisprudential method.6
In the same vein, Ibn Taymiyya sings Ibn Ḥazm's praises in the opening chapter of his fundamental book on dogma, Kitāb Mufaṣṣal al-iʿtiqād. 7 Ibn Ḥazm should be held in esteem for his theological views on various matters like predetermination, God's attributes and theodicy, when they are in agreement with the Sunna and ḥadīth, "because he confĳirms [what is written] in the reliable ḥadīths, and because he greatly considers the views of the traditionists."8 Again, this warm approval of Ibn Ḥazm is given on a limited basis. According to Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Ḥazm declares that his doctrine of the uncreatedness of the Qurʾān resembles that of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), which, however, is not accurate; his views only partly resemble those of Ibn Ḥanbal. True, Ibn Ḥazm is very competent in dealing with theological issues, but he introduced Muʿtazilī and falsafī concepts into his discussions of divine attributes, including the divine attribute of the speech of God, and that diverted him from the path of ahl al-ḥadīth. Ibn Taymiyya adds that the novel ideas adopted by Ibn Ḥazm and embedded in his writings are the reason for his condemnation by Sunnī scholars.9
Another example of Ibn Taymiyya's approval of Ibn Ḥazm's view is the case of prolonging one's standing position during prayer, so that it equals the amount of time taken to perform a prostration. In al-Qawāʿid al-nūrāniyya Ibn Taymiyya quotes an anecdote on the tābiʿī Abū ʿUbayda [ʿĀmir] b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Masʿūd (d. 81-2/700-2) from Kūfa, who was criticized for prolonging the standing position (qiyām) after prostration (rukūʿ ) while praying. This anecdote is followed by a remark by Ibn Ḥazm, which indicates that Abū ʿUbayda's praying routine was good: "Shame on those who denounce the actions of the Prophet, and woe to the one, who has no proof [for what he is claiming]." Ibn Taymiyya, who favors Ibn Ḥazm's ruling in this case, adds that those who denounced the son of the illustrious ṣaḥābī ʿAbd Allāh b. Masʿūd (d. 32/653) were not scholars, and that in 6 Ibn Taymiyya, vol. 3, p. 169 . For qiyās jalī, see Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics, p. 169 . For istiṣḥāb see Abū Zahra, Ibn Ḥazm, " Encyclopedia of Islam. New Edition, vol. 11, 7 The title of the book is probably taken from Q 6:114 "For it is He who sent down to you the Book well-distinguished" (bayān mufaṣṣal). The translation of this verse, as of all the Qurʾānic verses in this article is by Arthur J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted, unless otherwise stated. 8 Ibn Taymiyya, vol. 4, . 9 Ibid.
© 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-23424-6 any case Abū ʿUbayda was likely to follow his father's conduct rather than the conduct of those ignorant Kufans.10 Ibn Taymiyya often refers to Ibn Ḥazm's views and rulings in the course of discussions on various subjects. These references and even precise citations, frequently set in large-scale surveys on the views of scholars from diffferent Islamic trends, are occasional and do not necessarily attribute any special meaning or importance to Ibn Ḥazm's views. On the other hand, they demonstrate Ibn Taymiyya's profound acquaintance with al-Muḥallā, Ibn Ḥazm's book on furūʿ. For example, in a fatwā given on the subject of soiled liquids, Ibn Taymiyya cites Ibn Ḥazm's opinion when he surveys all recorded opinions on this matter. Ibn Taymiyya was asked whether or not olive-oil, in which a mouse fell, is impure. He cites Ibn Ḥazm's ruling that liquids are not soiled when impurities fall into them, except when a mouse falls into cooking butter. In this case, the cooking butter is soiled and cannot be used. Ibn Taymiyya rejects Ibn Ḥazm's view, because a prophetic ḥadīth clearly states: "Throw the mouse away, and consume [the liquid] in which it was immersed." Hence, according to Ibn Taymiyya's view, the cooking butter is not soiled.11 On the other hand, in the course of a discussion on a ḥadīth about divorcing a woman thrice, Ibn Taymiyya presents Ibn Ḥazm as a ḥadīth authority, second in importance only to luminaries like Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and Muḥammad b. Apart from these occasional references to Ibn Ḥazm, Ibn Taymiyya also offfers a more systematic reading in the latter's writings. One such example is Ibn Taymiyya's Naqd marātib al-ijmāʿ.13 In this short treatise, Ibn Taymiyya 10 Ibn Taymiyya, Qawāʿid, p. 95; Ibn Taymiyya, vol. 22, . The ḥadīth in a slightly diffferent version appears in Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 4, vol. 1, . For Ibn Ḥazm's view, see his Muḥallā, vol. 1, p. 135. 12 Ibn Taymiyya, vol. 3, p. 283 (masʾala 9/546) . Caterina Bori maintains that Ibn Taymiyya was inspired by Ibn Ḥazm's views on divorce. Bori, Ibn Taymiyya, p. 157. 13 A good edition of Naqd marātib al-ijmāʿ was published together with Ibn Ḥazm's Marātib al-ijmāʿ. Naqd marātib al-ijmāʿ is not mentioned in any of the lists on Ibn Taymiyya's works. In one such list, which was attributed to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, but in fact was written by his contemporary Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. Rushayyiq, the title Qāʿida fī al-ijmāʿ appears. This work is not extant. In al- Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt by al-Ṣafadī (d. 764/1362-63) another promising title of a non-extant work, Muʾākhadha li-Ibn Ḥazm fī l-ijmāʿ, appears. Cf. ʿUzayr Jāmiʿ, 243, 294, 317, 331 Most of the cases on which, according to him (i.e. Ibn Ḥazm), there is a consensus (ijmāʿ ), are exactly as he puts them, meaning these cases are not disputable, as far as we know. What is meant [in this work which refutes Ibn Ḥazm] is to demonstrate that although he had a vast knowledge of the sayings of scholars, in which he surpassed other scholars, and although he established a theoretical basis for the conditions of consensus, it is quite evident that there are well-known disagreements about the so-called consensual matters which he mentioned. In some of these cases the preponderant (rājiḥ) [view] of consensus was actually the opposite of what he mentioned.14 Ibn Taymiyya also discusses Ibn Ḥazm's views as they appear in al-Faṣl fī l-milal wal-niḥal. One of these discussions led the Egyptian scholar Muḥammad Abū Zahra (d. 1974) to declare that Ibn Taymiyya is Ibn Ḥazm's successor in at least one fundamental issue. The author of very comprehensive biographies of Ibn Ḥazm and Ibn Taymiyya and by all means well-read in both these scholars' writings, Abū Zahra claims that Ibn Taymiyya adopted Ibn Ḥazm's skeptical view on miracles performed by so-called saints during their lifetime and after their death. This view became the cornerstone of Ibn Taymiyya's stand against the visitation of graves in particular, and against popular Ṣūfī inclined rituals in general. According to Ibn Ḥazm, miracles (muʿjizāt), which break the natural order of things (al-taḥawwul al-khāriq lil-ʿāda) are performed only by prophets, and not by virtuous people (ṣāliḥūn). It is God who changes the natural order of things for the prophets, in order to demonstrate the veracity of their message. Since virtuous people do not perform miracles, says Ibn Ḥazm, there is no reason to sanctify their memory. Moreover, dead prophets do not perform miracles either, because the veracity of their message was already proven during their lifetime. As Ibn Ḥazm determines, miracles could not have happened after the Prophet Muḥammad's death.15 Abū Zahra sums up: "Ibn Ḥazm has torn up and uprooted this tree, because he denied the possibility of miracles (preternatural phenomena, khawāriq).
Al-Jāmiʿ was published under the auspices of Bakr b. ʿAbd Allāh Abū Zayd, the most prominent contemporary scholar of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, who has published a series of their works in scientifĳic editions. On Ibn Rushayyiq see also Bori, Ibn Taymiyya, p. 40. 14 Ibn Taymiyya, Naqd, p. 302. 15 Abū Zahra, Ibn Ḥazm, pp. 210-213; idem, Ibn Taymiyya. © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-23424-6 [He claimed] that all men are equal, and that no one has superiority over others in terms of creation. A virtuous man should not be sanctifĳied, and no extraordinary power should be attributed to him or to anyone else. A miracle (karāma) is not to be attributed to anyone. No miracle is attributed to a prophet after his death."16 As Abū Zahra puts it, although Ibn Taymiyya basically accepted the possibility of saints performing miracles, and in that he difffered from Ibn Ḥazm, all the same, he was Ibn Ḥazm's aggressive successor, because the latter had set the theoretical foundation for Ibn Taymiyya's activities against the sacralization of graves.17 Although Abū Zahra's statement that "Ibn Taymiyya came and aggressively preached the same message that the genius Ibn Ḥazm started to preach"18 is generally inaccurate, given Ibn Taymiyya's attacks on Ibn Ḥazm's views, it has a grain of truth, as it clarifĳies Ibn Ḥazm's role in Ibn Taymiyya's writings, and later on in Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's writings. Ibn Ḥazm's literary output was, fĳirst of all, carefully studied by the two Ḥanbalī thinkers. Then these two scholars examined Ibn Ḥazm's provocative and stimulating views: whether they refuted them using solid textual evidence or accepted them, Ibn Ḥazm ignited a process of examining doctrinal conventions. Taking an element of his thinking and applying it to the sacred sources enriched their hermeneutics and enabled them to develop new ideas, not to be considered bidʿa but a defence of the sanctities of Islam.
Ibn Ḥazm is indeed very much present in the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. This is Abdelilah Ljamai's impression in his study on Ibn Ḥazm and Muslim-Christian polemic. Ljamai Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Ḥazm; pp. 186, 308, 605; The Ḥanbalī School, Rapoport, "Ibn Taymiyya's Radical Legal Thought, " p. 203. 19 Ljamai, Ibn Ḥazm, p. 175 Ibn Ḥazm's presence in Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's writings is quite substantial: there are long and meaningful citations from Ibn Ḥazm's works in a number of works, in which Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya addresses subjects that his mentor omitted, or at least mentioned them only briefly. In these works, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya offfers more than his well-known systematic exegesis of Ibn Taymiyya's works, and in a way cuts loose from Taymiyyan areas of interest. We fĳind Ibn Ḥazm in monographs in which Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya discusses, for instance, profane love and raising children, topics which were not precisely at the top of the celibate Ibn Taymiyya's agenda. Ibn Ḥazm is also very conspicuous in monographs dealing with topics that Ibn Taymiyya was interested in, like the Prophet Muḥammad's biography, but on which he did not write a systematic study.
Throughout the process of collecting data for this study, it became quite evident that both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya read several of Ibn Ḥazm's major works and mentioned them numerous times in their writings.24 Still, it was not so easy to defĳine what Ibn Ḥazm meant to Ibn 20 Ljamai, Ibn Ḥazm, pp. 185, 190. 23 Ibid., esp. nn. 59, 60, 65. 24 and al-Ṭawq has been surveyed in several studies. Lois Anita Gifffen (1992) lists all the references to Ibn Ḥazm in al-Rawḍa, and concludes that Ibn Ḥazm impressed Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya "sufffĳiciently, so that he quoted him thrice to support a point, though he also criticized him four times."26 Joseph Bell (1979) , following Gifffen (1971) , discussed Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's interpretation of al-Ṭawq, and specifĳically the way in which Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya understood Ibn Ḥazm's approach towards men glancing at women other than their wives.27 Al-Ṭawq fĳits perfectly in Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's major fĳields of interest, which are moral theology and poetry. Since the thematic afffĳinities between al-Ṭawq and al-Rawḍa have already been discussed by Bell and Gifffen, I shall refrain from repeating them here, and instead will point out the possible contribution of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's works to the reconstruction of al-Ṭawq.
In a 1993 article, P.S. van Koningsveld identifĳied al-Rawḍa as an important piece in the jigsaw-puzzle of al-Ṭawq, because it contains a passage which does not exist in the Leiden manuscript, the only known manuscript of al-Ṭawq. Hence, Van Koningsveld assumes that Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya had an unabridged version of al-Ṭawq.28 That al-Ṭawq was well-known to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, is also concluded from the circumstances in which he composed al-Rawḍa. This work belongs to a group of fĳive works, which Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya wrote while away from his home and his rich library, probably during his long stays in Mecca. In the introduction to al-Rawḍa, the author apologizes for not having his books with him when writing this work. This apology, however, is a good indication of his thorough acquaintance with al-Ṭawq, since he was able to cite passages from it without having the actual copy in front of him. 29 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya used al-Ṭawq in at least one more work: al-Dāʾ wal-dawāʾ, also known as al-Jawāb al-kāfī li-man sa ʾala ʿan al-dawāʾ al-shāfī. 26 Gifffen, " pp. 427, 440 n. 27. 27 Bell, Love Theory, p. 128 . For Gifffen's discussion, see Gifffen, Theory of Profane Love, . Bell systematically identifĳies all the passages in Rawḍat al-muḥibbīn which are taken from al-Ṭawq. For the passage on the afffĳinity between souls prior to the existence of the body, see Bell, Love Theory, pp. 75, 236 n. 9, 112, 114, 247 n. 64. 28 Van Koningsveld, "De oorspronkelijke versie." I thank Joachim Yeshaya for sending me the article and translating the relevant passages for me.
29 In the introduction to Rawḍat al-muḥibbīn, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya writes: "Whoever takes this book in his hands should forgive its author for writing this book away from his home and without his books." Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Rawḍa, p. 14. Gifffen (Theory of Profane Love, p. 37) assumes that the book was written in Egypt. In my opinion, however, it is one of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's Meccan works. Cf. my "Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah," pp. 212-213, 217. © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-23424-6 The last part of this work, which deals with moral theology, is a treatise on love. While the citations from al-Ṭawq in al-Rawḍa were identifĳied by previous researches, the resemblance between the last part of al-Jawāb and al-Ṭawq has never been investigated. The two following examples illustrate the triple linkage between al-Jawāb, al-Rawḍa and al-Ṭawq.
The passage from al-Ṭawq which is quoted by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya in al-Rawḍa is an anecdote about the Caliph ʿUmar b. al- Khaṭṭāb (d. 23/644) . This is the version of the anecdote, as it appears in al-Rawḍa: The italicized sentence is the fourth sentence of the fĳirst chapter of al-Ṭawq, as it appears in the only manuscript of al-Ṭawq. Hence, the passage in al-Jawāb provides a clue as to the place of the anecdote on ʿUmar: in the opening chapter of al- Ṭawq.32 Another quotation from al-Ṭawq in al-Jawāb is interesting for two reasons: it does not appear in al-Rawḍa; it provides another passage, which does not appear in the extant version of al-Ṭawq, and was perhaps taken from the version Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya had read. The fĳirst part of the quotation in al-Jawāb is an anecdote about the great scholar and ṣaḥābī Rawḍa, p. 142 . I was privileged to use a copy of al-Rawḍa that belonged to the late Prof. Rina Drory, who meticulously indicated all the parallel passages from al-Ṭawq in the book and fĳilled it with numerous valuable notes. I thank Prof. Joseph Drory who kindly gave me the book. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya continues in a passage that is not found in al-Ṭawq:
While he (i.e. Ibn ʿAbbās) was in ʿArafa (the mountain located east of Mecca), a young man as fragile as a chick was brought to him. He asked: 'What is the matter with him?' They answered: 'Passionate love'. Thus, [Ibn ʿAbbās] started to spend most of his days asking God for protection from love. 34 So far, it is impossible to determine whether this anecdote indeed belongs to al-Ṭawq. Further investigation in al-Jawāb might provide more leads to the unabridged version of al-Ṭawq.
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The eighth chapter in al-Tuḥfa deals with naming babies: when to give the baby its name, preferable names versus prohibited and distasteful names, and other rules and advice on giving names.37 This chapter, like the other chapters of al-Tuḥfa, is a collection of quotations from several works on fĳiqh and theology. In between, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya inserts his opinion on this point or the other, refutes this author or the other, while examining the textual proofs given by the various authors. Ibn Ḥazm is certainly not the most prominent fĳigure whose opinions are dealt with in this work; still, the way Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya examines the Ḥazmian text represents his overall approach to Ibn Ḥazm.
A passage from al-Marātib, dealing with the most favored human names in the eyes of God, nicely fĳits the goals of al-Tuḥfa as a guide to parents. After quoting four ḥadīths on favorable names in the eyes of God, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya quotes the following sentence from al-Marātib: "Abū Muḥammad b. Ḥazm said: they (i.e. the scholars) agreed that the names annexed to Allāh, like ʿAbd Allāh, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and their likes, are good."38 While Ibn Ḥazm presents this assertion as a consensus, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya describes the most favorite names as a matter of dispute rather than as a matter of agreement, even in the days of the ṣaḥāba:
The experts of fĳiqh disagreed which names are the most beloved in the eyes of God. The majority of scholars agreed that ʿAbd Allāh and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān are the most beloved. Saʿīd b. al-Musayyib (d. 94/713) said that the most beloved names in the eyes of God are the names of the prophets. The sound ḥadīth proves that the most beloved names in the eyes of God are ʿAbd Allāh and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. 39 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's goal is to present views, which Ibn Ḥazm did not present, and to demonstrate that the favorite names are indeed so because the ḥadīth says so, and not because of a consensus among the legal scholars. He also refutes Ibn Ḥazm's views more bluntly. He fĳirst quotes another assertion by Ibn Ḥazm:
They agreed that every name, which indicates someone or something to worship except Allāh, like ʿAbd al-ʿUzzā, ʿAbd Hubal, ʿAbd ʿAmr, ʿAbd Tuḥfa, . A short section that deals with the different issues arising from naming children is found in Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Zād, vol. From what Ibn Ḥazm says here, one might conclude that naming a baby ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib is permitted, perhaps because ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib is a nickname given to the Prophet's grandfather after his uncle, Muṭṭalib. In any case, Ibn Ḥazm does not indicate any textual evidence to corroborate his view. Rejecting Ibn Ḥazm's view, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya gives a detailed explanation that criticizes the Ḥazmian hermeneutics. He fĳirst diffferentiates between two concepts. Inshāʾ, which basically means to create, is understood here by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya as giving a new name to someone, for instance a newborn. Ikhbār is used here by Ibn al-Qayyim as indicating the identity of someone by using the name, which distinguishes him from others. The possibilities of ikhbār, says Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, are potentially much broader than the possibilities of inshāʾ: it is permitted to call someone by his well-known name, even if this name has an undesirable meaning, such as "the slave of Muṭṭalib." Hence, calling someone, who is known as ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib, by his name is permitted. Giving a newborn this name is prohibited. One of the texts that Ibn Qayyim alJawziyya adduces to corroborate his view is a sound ḥadīth, according to which a man came to a group of people and asked: "Which one of you is the son of ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib?" to which the Prophet responded: "I am the son of ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib."41 Both Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya and Ibn Taymiyya examined favorable and disliked names in their writings.42 However, the small passage from Ibn Ḥazm's al-Marātib drew the attention of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya and inspired him to start looking for the so-called consensus in the matter of naming a baby ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib. Not having found it, Ibn al-Qayyim refutes Ibn Ḥazm by using a sound ḥadīth, but mostly by using his common sense, which brings to mind the Ḥazmian method of refutation. Tuḥfa, p. 84; Ibn Ḥazm, Tuḥfa, p. 85. 42 Discussions on favorable and disliked names appear in several places in the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. Nevertheless, the view attributed to Ibn Ḥazm in al-Tuḥfa does not appear in any of these sources. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ, Ibn Taymiyya, vol. 1, vol. 7, vol. 9, , vol. 18, p. 142 ("sharḥ ḥadīth innamā al-aʿmāl bil-niyyāt").
Al-Faṣl fī l-milal (I)
Al-Faṣl fī l-milal wal-ahwāʾ wal-niḥal, Ibn Ḥazm's encyclopedic work on theology, heresiography and philosophy, is one source that Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya goes back to time and again throughout his scholarly career, citing and refuting it.43 He used al-Faṣl extensively while composing one of his early works, Kitāb al-Rūḥ, which is considered to be the most comprehensive survey ever written on the doctrine of the human spirit (rūḥ) or the human soul (nafs). Kitāb al-Rūḥ was characterized and discussed by D.B. Macdonald in his 1931 article. Joseph Bell also analyzed the eighteenth query of Kitāb al-rūḥ. Recently the book has drawn the attention of Geneviève Gobillot and Tzvi Langermann, whose important analyses of this work are published in a volume dedicated to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. 44 Adding to what has been said so far on Kitāb al-Rūḥ, I would like to examine Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's use of al-Faṣl in this work. The uniqueness of Kitāb al-Rūḥ, the scope of the issues it deals with and the richness of the sources it draws from, strengthens the ingenuity of this work, which, unlike many of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's theological works, was most likely created without the mediation of any of Ibn Taymiyya's works.
Kitāb al-Rūḥ illustrates two separate approaches to the writings of Ibn Ḥazm: the fĳirst approach is an acceptance of Ibn Ḥazm's views and argumentations. This approach is accompanied by a faithful reliance on the Ḥazmian text, even when Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya does not specifĳically state that he draws from it. The second approach is a systematic literal device of quotation-refutation, in which Ibn al-Qayyim strives to rebut Ibn Ḥazm's argumentation by attacking the latter's examination of the canonical texts. In general, these two approaches appear in diffferent sections of Kitāb al-rūḥ: while the nineteenth query reflects an acceptance of Ibn Ḥazm's views and even an over-reliance on his writings, the sixth and fĳifteenth queries reflect a rejection of Ibn Ḥazm's reading techniques and 43 Abdelilah Ljamai, as noted before, has systematically traced citations from al-Faṣl in Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's works on the polemic with Christianity; cf. Ljamai, Ibn Ḥazm, pp. 186fff . 44 Macdonald, "Development." Most of Macdonald's fĳindings are summarized in E.E. Calverley and I.R. Netton, "Nafs," Encyclopedia of Islam. New Edition, vol. 7, Bell, Love Theory, pp. 114fff conclusions.45 In order to simplify the discussion, this section does not refer to all the fĳindings scattered in other parts of Kitāb al-Rūḥ, like the eighteenth query in which Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya examines Ibn Ḥazm's reading of ḥadīth material and which was already discussed by Bell.46 Of the three major issues, viz. the spirits of the living, the spirits of the dead and the creation of the spirits, with regard to which Ibn Qayyim alJawziyya quotes al-Faṣl, only the fĳirst two will be discussed here, in order to demonstrate the way in which Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya draws from the Ḥazmian text.47
A substantial part of the nineteenth query of Kitāb al-Rūḥ, a conglomerate of citations and paraphrases from various sources, is borrowed from Ibn Ḥazm, but also from other thinkers, like al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935-6), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) and al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. between 318/936 and 320/938).48 At the beginning of the chapter, Ibn Qayyim alJawziyya presents the fundamentals of the discussion: "What is the essence of the soul (nafs)? Is it one of the parts of the human body, one of the accidents of the human body, is it a body in itself (jism), which resides in the human body and is entrusted in it, or is it a pure substance (jawhar)?" What follows-a survey of scholarly views on this question-is actually a paraphrase of several pages from Ibn Ḥazm's chapter "On substances, accidents, body and soul" (al-kalām fī l-jawāhir wa-mā l-jism wa-mā l-nafs) from al-Faṣl. 49 Ibn Ḥazm's view that the soul (nafs) is a dimensional body, separated from the sensible body and independent, is embraced by Ibn Qayyim alJawziyya. The latter also adopts Ibn Ḥazm's lexical defĳinition: "Soul (nafs) and spirit (rūḥ) are synonyms denoting the same signifĳicance."50 As the discussion proceeds, it becomes apparent that Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's 45 The favorable approach taken by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya in the 19th query could serve as evidence for this query's status as an independent treatise, a theory presented by Langermann in a forthcoming article, "Ibn al-Qayyim's Kitāb al-Rūḥ: Some Literary Aspects." Doubts on the authenticity of Kitāb al-rūḥ are refuted by Bakr Abū Zayd, the author of the most comprehensive biography of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya; Abū Zayd, Love Theory, pp. 114fff. 47 The third issue is dealt with extensively by Genèvieve Gobillot in her article, see n. 44 above.
48 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Rūḥ, pp. 212-259. I thank Caterina Bori for sending me this excellent edition of Kitāb al-Rūḥ.
49 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Rūḥ, pp. 212fff. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 5, Rūḥ, p. 214. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 5, p. 202. Ibn Ḥazm also qualifĳies the soul as intelligent and rational (ʿāqila). Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, however, uses the defĳinition "body" ( juththa) instead.
© 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-23424-6 rebuttals of the opposing arguments relating to the notion of the corporeality of the spirit are either copied from Ibn Ḥazm or inspired by his arguments. For instance, to his opponents' claim that were the spirit a body, it would entail a delay between one's will to move his leg and the actual moving of the leg, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya responds that since the spirit lies exactly where the heart and brain lie, the moving of the leg is performed at exactly the same time as the will to move it occurs. The opponents' claim and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's refutation are indeed copied from al-Faṣl, hence representing Ibn Ḥazm's view. In this case, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya does not indicate his source.51 There are several more passages in the nineteenth query and elsewhere in Kitāb al-Rūḥ, containing what is supposedly Ibn al-Qayyim's argumentation for the corporeality of the spirit, but in fact these are copied from al-Faṣl, and as such actually represent Ibn Ḥazm's view.52
The argumentations in the nineteenth query of Kitāb al-Rūḥ, and those taken from Ibn Ḥazm are no exception, are rationalistic and inspired by the kalām heritage. On the other hand, the discussion about the spirits of the dead is embedded in rich eschatological anecdotes from the ḥadīth literature. Two major questions are raised in this context: Where do the spirits of the dead reside? Are the dead brought back to life in their graves before the chastisement of the grave (ʿadhāb al-qabr) occurs? These questions are discussed in the sixth and fĳifteenth queries.
The fĳifteenth query, entitled "where do the spirits reside from the time of death until the Day of Resurrection," begins with a faithful copying and paraphrasing of "on the residence of the spirits" (mustaqarr al-arwāḥ) in al-Faṣl,53 although the credit to Ibn Ḥazm is given later, when the latter's 51 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Rūḥ, p. 252 ("faṣl fī jawāb al-shubha al-rābiʿata ʿashrata"). Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 5, p. 206. 52 The claim that a corporeality of the spirit entails its dividedness, which Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya refutes by the counter-claim that several bodies, like the celestial ones, are in fact not subjected to dividedness, is actually copied from Ibn Ḥazm. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Rūḥ, p. 257 ("faṣl fī tardīd al-shubha al-ʿishrīn"). Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 5, On the other hand, the claim that if the spirit were a body, it would be in need of a soul (nafs), since every body needs a soul, receives a diffferent response from Ibn Qayyim alJawziyya than the one given by Ibn Ḥazm: whereas Ibn Ḥazm admits that this premise is correct, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya adds that inanimate bodies do not have souls. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Rūḥ, p. 258 ("faṣl fī tardīd al-shubha al-ḥādiya ʿashrata"). Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 5, p. 212. Ibn Ḥazm chooses to refute the second half of the opponents' claim, namely that a soul without a soul is not a soul, because it does not breathe.
53 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya elaborates Ibn Ḥazm's view twice in the fĳifteenth query. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Rūḥ, pp. 114-115, 135-136. These two almost identical versions of the text are parallel to Faṣl, vol. 4, © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-23424-6 disputable view is mentioned by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. Ibn Ḥazm's view, as cited by Ibn al-Qayyim (in a sentence which apparently does not appear in al-Faṣl ) is that "they (i.e. the souls) reside where they were before their bodies were created."54 Based on the description of Muḥammad's nocturnal journey and ascension to the seven heavens (al-isrāʾ wal-miʿrāj), Ibn Ḥazm determines that "the spirits of the believers are at Adam's right, while the spirits of the heretics are at his left," and that this place is the Barzakh (the boundary between this world and the world of the spirits). Ibn Ḥazm claims further on that the spirits' location is actually in the spot where the four elements, water, earth, fĳire and air, separate (munqatiʿ al-ʿanāṣir) . 55 This view serves as a trigger for Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's harsh criticism of Ibn Ḥazm, not only because he objects to the latter's view, but because he also rejects his methods. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya cannot accept Ibn Ḥazm's claim that the spirits are created before the creation of their sensible bodies, thus residing in the Barzakh until they are attached to them, because there is no specifĳic text proving it: "Those who say that the souls are created before the bodies have absolutely no proof for this, not from the Qurʾān or the Sunna or the consensus of the community (ijmāʿ). [They rely] solely on their understanding of the Qurʾānic text, which does not imply such a thing, and their understanding of unreliable ḥadīths."56 The core of this criticism is, therefore, Ibn Ḥazm's allegedly inaccurate reading of the texts. "He always slanders whoever says things without a suffĳicient proof," says Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, "so where is the textual proof from the Qurʾān and ḥadīth to [corroborate] this saying?"57 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's use of the present tense reflects the intensity of feelings that Ibn Ḥazm arouses in him. Like Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya gives credit to Ibn Ḥazm's thorough acquaintance with the sources, until he fĳinds an error or inaccuracy.58 However, in the case of the Barzakh, Ibn Rūḥ, Rūḥ, pp. 114, 134. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 4, Rūḥ, . Ibn Hazm's view, according to which the souls are created before the bodies, is mentioned also in the eighteenth query. Rūḥ, p. 190. The discussion actually repeats itself.
57 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Rūḥ, p. 134. 58 Joseph van Ess mentions another inaccuracy of Ibn Ḥazm's, which Ibn Qayyim alJawziyya corrects. Apparently, Ibn Ḥazm thought that the belief that the spirits of the heretics reside in the spring of Barahūt in Ḥaḍramawt, is a Shīʿī one. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya corrects him, and proves that it is in fact the belief of a group of Sunnīs. Van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 4, p. 522 Qayyim al-Jawziyya points out the inaccuracy with which Ibn Ḥazm treats the sources, using his harshest most unforgiving tone, generally reserved for his more bitter rivals, the Ashʿarites.
Another major point of dispute between Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya and Ibn Ḥazm appears in the sixth query, which addresses the question of what state the deceased are in during the chastisements of the grave, dead or alive. Ibn Ḥazm's basic stand is for the existence of the chastisement of the grave, but against the idea that the dead live in their graves before the Day of Resurrection.59 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, on the other hand, determines that the dead indeed live, though not in the proper sense of the word. 60 Ibn Ḥazm's principal line of argumentation is based here on two Qurʾānic verses, which serve as proof that God causes us to die twice and brings us back to life twice.61 "Had the dead lived in their graves," argues Ibn Ḥazm, "God would have caused us to die and brought us back to life thrice."62 He then determines that the spirits of the dead reside in the 59 Rūḥ, p. 55. Cf. Faṣl, vol. 4, pp. 118-119. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya chose not to cite the fĳirst part of Ibn Ḥazm's argument for the existence of the chastisement of the grave, based on a reading of Q 6:93: "If thou couldst only see when the evildoers are in the agonies of death, and the angels are stretching out their hands: 'Give up your souls! Today you shall be recompensed with the chastisement of humiliation for what you said untruly about God, waxing proud against His signs'." According to Ibn Ḥazm, the chastisement applies also to those dead who have no graves, like the ones eaten by wild beasts, burnt to ashes, crucifĳied and hanged, because every dead who has no grave "shall be returned as ashes or excrement, or shall be cut to pieces, and in [one of] these forms, he shall be restored back to this world." Faṣl, vol. 4, p. 118. As for the Day of Resurrection, Ibn Ḥazm gives Qurʾānic evidence (Q 39:42) according to which only on the Day of Resurrection will the spirits be restored to the bodies.
60 In this case, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya relies on Ibn Taymiyya. The latter's view, that the souls are restored to the bodies at the time of the chastisement of the grave is cited in the end of the section "how the soul of the believer and the soul of the apostate are torn out, and a detailed description of what happens to them in the grave" (dhikr ḥālat al-nazʿ li-rūḥ al-muʾmin wa-li-rūḥ al-kāfĳir wa-mā yamḍī ʿalayhimā fī l-qabr mufaṣṣalan). Rūḥ, p. 65. Ibn Taymiyya gave his legal opinion on the matter in two diffferent fatwās. Ibn Taymiyya, vol. 4, vol. 5, .
61 "They shall say, "Our Lord, Thou hast caused us to die two deaths and Thou hast given us twice to live; now we confess our sins. Is there any way to go forth?" (Q 40:11) . In this verse, it is the unbelievers who attest to this double resurrection. The second verse: "How do you disbelieve in God, seeing you were dead and He gave you life, then He shall make you dead, then He shall give you life, then unto Him you shall be returned?" (Q 2:28). In this verse, the speaker is God. To a degree, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya accepts Ibn Ḥazm's argumentation. Although he criticizes Ibn Ḥazm's assertion that whoever thinks that the dead live on in their graves is wrong, as being too general (fīhi ijmāl), he agrees with Ibn Ḥazm that the dead could not be literally living in their graves, at least not the conventional life of this world (al-ḥayāt al-maʿhūda fī l-dunyā), and adds that on top of the Qurʾānic texts, natural instincts and logical reasoning lead us to accept Ibn Ḥazm's argumentation. Nevertheless, Ibn al-Qayyim points out that there could be life other than this life, in which the soul is restored to the body, but not in the way it is restored to it in this life. The purpose of this "other life" (ḥayāt ukhrā) is indeed to allow the dead to be questioned and judged in their graves. Negating the possibility of this specifĳic other life, then, is wrong.65
Finally, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's sole textual evidence for his stand on the restoration of life to the dead is a ḥadīth, in which the Prophet attends a funeral, describes the chastisements of the grave in detail, and states that "his (i.e. the dead man's) spirit is restored to his body (fa-tuʿādu rūḥuhu fī jasadihi)."66 Although Ibn Ḥazm rejected this ḥadīth on the grounds that its transmitter is a weak authority (laysa bi-qawī, "not strong"), Ibn 63 Here he uses the Prophet's testimony that during his nocturnal journey he saw the souls of the dead in the Lower Heaven next to Adam: the souls of the believers at his right, and the souls of the sinners at his left. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Rūḥ, p. 56. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 4, Rūḥ, p. 56. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 4 
Al-Faṣl fī l-milal (II)
One of the peaks of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's literary output is an impressive qaṣīda of six thousand verses entitled al-Kāfĳiya al-shāfĳiya fī l-intiṣār lilfĳirqa al-nājiya.68 It is one of his fairly early polemical works, although Ibn al-Qayyim undoubtedly wrote it after Kitāb al-Rūḥ. Ten verses from this qaṣīda are dedicated to Ibn Ḥazm and his pragmatic view of the temporal manifestations of the Qurʾān, a view which Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya strives so hard to refute in another twenty-eight verses. In these verses, then, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya does not adopt the Ḥazmian text; he observes it, only to refute it.
The question of the temporal manifestations of the Qurʾān goes back to the debates on the uncreatedness of the Qurʾān from the 9th century ce onward. Since the attribute of God's speech (kalām allāh), which is a common synonym for the Qurʾān, is uncreated, are these manifestations of the Qurʾān uncreated too? In a nutshell, the Lafẓiyya, traditionalists from diffferent trends, the most conspicuous of whom is Ibn Kullāb p. 112 n. 14 the editor provides more references to ḥadīth collections, in which this ḥadīth appears.
67 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Rūḥ, pp. 62-63. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 4, p. 119 and Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 1, p. 22. The ḥadīth authority whose reliability Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya seeks to prove is the Kufan al-Minhāl b. ʿAmr (d. 117/735), whose credibility was shaken because singing voices were heard from his house. According to Ibn Ḥazm, Minhāl's stand was unique and opposite to the rest of ḥadīths on the subject, and in addition he was not a strong authority. Faṣl, vol. 4, p. 119. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya restores Mihāl's honour, and asserts that the transmitter of "the soul is restored to his body" is one of the most reliable transmitters. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Rūḥ, pp. 57, 62-63.
68 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, al-Kāfĳiya al-shāfĳiya fī l-intiṣār lil-fĳirqa al-nājiya, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad al-ʿUmayr, Riyadh 1416/1996. Written in the kāmil meter, al-Kāfĳiya al-shāfĳiya is also known as al-Qaṣīda al-nūniyya ("the Ode Rhyming in -n"). al-Kāfĳiya al-shāfĳiya is frequently mentioned by later Ḥanbalī authors. One of the commentators of this work, Muḥammad Khalīl Harrās (d. 1975) , declares that it has gained the undisputed status of a defĳining work of Salafī doctrine. Cf. his Sharḥ al-qaṣīda al-nūniyya, vol. 1, p. 11. I thank Jon Hoover for clarifying important points of this part of the article.
© 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-23424-6 (d. 241/855?), held the view that kalām Allāh is uncreated, while the human utterance (lafẓ) of the Qurʾān is created. For this view they were harshly attacked by the Ḥanbalīs. "Beware of he who says: my utterance of the Qurʾān is created!" warns the traditionist, Abū Bakr al-Ājurrī (d. 360/971), on the authority of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, "for he is a heretic."69 Although condemned as heresy by the Ḥanbalīs, the concept of the createdness of the temporal manifestations of the Qurʾān was cautiously reexamined by later Ashʿarites. Sticking to Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal's shibboleth, the prominent theologian Abū Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī avoided discussing the matter, stating: "One does not say whether the human utterance of the Qurʾān is created or uncreated." Later Ashʿarīs, however, explored ways to defĳine the temporal manifestations of the Qurʾān. For instance, the 11th century ce theologian al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) redefĳined the human utterance as "a meaning (maʿnā) subsisting in the soul (nafs)."70
The Ḥanbalīs, with the exception of several scholars with rationalistic tendencies, were the only traditionalists unwilling to take any stand towards the question of the createdness of the temporal manifestations of the Qurʾān. Not only were they unwilling to accept it, but also unable to reject it.71 As for other trends, substantially they all say the same thing, or as Ibn Taymiyya puts it, the debate on the majority of doctrinal questions is "merely terminological" (wal-nizāʿ baynahum fī kathīr min al-mawāḍiʿ, lafẓiyyun).72 The question is, then, what term to use when describing the temporal manifestations of the Qurʾān. Some (Muʿtazilīs and Ashʿarites, mainly) have used the distinction between "the reciting" (al-qirāʾa), which is the created act of the human being, and "what is recited" (al-maqrūʾ), which is the speech of God, hence uncreated. Others (this is the solution of Ibn Kullāb) have used the term "version" (ḥikāya) to denote Qurʾāns which exist in various forms in this world. The distinction between "utterance" (lafẓ), which is created, and "meaning" (maʿnā) which is uncreated, is also being made in many theological works. various scholars, apart from their choice of terminology, is how far they are willing to go in order to express this concept.
Ibn Ḥazm also had his share in this discussion, contributing several interesting insights. His argument, which appears in al-Faṣl, is basically a follow-up to Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal's stand. It begins with what seems to be a mere reflection of the conventional Sunnī formula of the uncreatedness of the Qurʾān, but it goes further, as Ibn Ḥazm claims that there are, in fact, created Qurʾāns. 73 Ibn Ḥazm's argument has two interwoven characteristics: a traditionalist, or rather, a conservative view, and a rationalist-pragmatic one. The traditionalist view appears in Ibn Ḥazm's profession of faith (ʿaqīda) in his Kitāb al-Muḥallā and Marātib al-ijmāʿ, while the rationalist view appears in al-Faṣl. Even so, the distinction between these two texts is rather schematic, because there are allusions to his rationalist theory in the ʿaqīda. At the same time, Ibn Ḥazm's theory of the Qurʾānic manifestations as it appears in al-Faṣl is abundant in Qurʾānic evidence, used also by other traditionalist thinkers on the same subject, hence its traditionalist characteristics are quite evident.
Relying heavily on the Qurʾān, the relevant article of faith in Kitāb al-Muḥallā seems to be traditionalist through and through. It goes as follows:
The Qurʾān is the speech of God and His knowledge, and hence uncreated, as is written in the Qurʾān (Q. 41:45): 'And but for a word from your Lord, long since decreed, their diffference would have been justly settled'. Therefore, He, to Him belong might and glory, has informed [us] , that His speech is His knowledge, and that it is eternal and uncreated. [The Qurʾān] is what is written in the copies of the Qurʾān (maṣāḥif ; sing. muṣḥaf). It is what one hears from the reciter. It is what the believers preserve in their hearts, and also what Jibrīl has brought down to Muḥammad's heart. All these are God's book and His Word. All these are the Qurʾān, literally and not fĳiguratively. Whoever says, that any of these is not the Qurʾān and not God's Word, is an infĳidel, since his stand opposes that of God's, the Prophet's and the consensus of the Islamic community.74 73 Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 3, , esp. 14-18 ("al-kalām fī l-qurʾān wa-huwa al-qawl fī kalām Allāh taʿālā"). The rationalist argument of Ibn Ḥazm appears in the chapter "the dispute on the Qurʾān, which focuses on the belief that the Qurʾān is God's speech (al-kalām fī l-qurʾān wa-huwa al-qawl fī kalām allāh taʿālā)" in al-Faṣl. It begins with a traditionalist statement, develops into a polemic with the Ashʿarites and Muʿtazilīs, and reaches its peak while molding a rationalist formula on the manifestations of the Qurʾān. The theoretical platform on which Ibn Ḥazm establishes his argumentation is both linguistic and philosophical. First, Ibn Ḥazm defĳines the Qurʾān as God's speech (kalām Allāh) and states that both terms really mean the same. In his words: "It is one meaning and two diffferent words" (maʿnan wāḥidun wal-lafẓāni mukhtalifāni). Hence, a person reciting the Qurʾān and a person reciting God's speech are two identical sentences with diffferent ways of expression.78
This being established, Ibn Ḥazm now turns to his theory, according to which there are four created manifestations of the Qurʾān, and a fĳifth Qurʾān, which is uncreated. The fĳirst manifestation is the human voice that we hear, in which God's speech is pronounced (al-ṣawt al-masmūʿ al-malfūẓ bihi) .79 However, the human voice merely carries God's speech.
75 "The Kuran is the Speech of Allah, written in the copies, preserved in the memories, recited by the tongues, revealed to the Prophet. Our pronouncing, writing and reciting the Kuran is created, whereas the Kuran itself is uncreated." A translation of a Ḥanafī creed, entitled "the Fiḳh Akbar II," from Wensinck, Muslim Creed, p. 189.
76 One of the most thorough surveys on the uncreatedness of the Qurʾān is Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's Ijtimāʿ. For accurate citations of Ashʿarite views of the subject, see Ijtimāʿ, 192, [233] [234] 248, 282. 77 For the formula "the speech of God equals the knowledge of God," see: Madelung, "Controversy," p. 515. See also al- Ājurrī, p. 87. 78 Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 2, p. 14. 79 Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 2, p. 14. Ibn Ḥazm emphasizes: "We say that it is truly God's speech" (kalām Allāh taʿālā ḥaqīqatan). Ibn Ḥazm corroborates this view through four Qurʾānic verses which indicate that the Qurʾānic text itself refers to Qurʾānic verses heard by humans and jinn as God's speech. Two of these verses connect God's speech with human hearing: "If an idolator seeks asylum with you, give him protection so that he may hear the Word of God" (Q 9:6); "Do you then hope that they will believe in you, when some of them have already heard the Word of God and knowingly perverted it, although they understood its meaning?" (Q 2:75). The possibility of hearing God's Word or God's speech directly from God is refuted in the beginning of the chapter, since Moses is the only human to whom God has spoken directly. Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 2, p. 11 . One of the verses connects between the Qurʾān and the jinn hearing it: "It is revealed to me that a band of jinn listened to God's revelations and said: 'We have heard a wondrous Koran giving guidance to the © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-23424-6 Thus, the content of the divine message is the second manifestation of the Qurʾān.80 The third Qurʾānic manifestation is the written copy of the Qurʾān, the book (muṣḥaf).81 The fourth Qurʾānic manifestation is the speech of God as remembered by humans, or as Ibn Ḥazm puts it, what resides in the human heart (al-mustaqirr fī l-ṣudūr).82 The fĳifth Qurʾānic manifestation is God's speech, which is God's knowledge, eternal and uncreated. 83 Ibn Ḥazm's theory is but a variation of similar theories by earlier theologians, meant to distinguish the divine from the worldly, such as the Ashʿarite distinction between "the reciting" (al-qirāʾa), which is the created act of the human being, and "what is recited" (al-maqrūʾ).84 It is the straightforward common sense approach that makes Ibn Ḥazm's theory so distinctive. Without hiding behind sophisticated arguments, he explains why we must accept the createdness of the fĳirst four manifestations of the Qurʾān, and the uncreatedness of the fĳifth. The human voice, for example, is air that is pushed out of the human organs such as the throat and the chest. Other organs, such as the palate, the tongue, the lips, and the teeth, participate in formulating the human voice, which is perceived eventually by the human ears. The objects of the Qurʾānic narrative, like the angels, the believers, heaven and earth, prayer and alms, the memory of annihilated ancient peoples, all these are created, while God's Word is uncreated. The muṣḥaf is created. We can clearly see, says Ibn right path'" (Q 72:1). One of the verses connects between the Qurʾān and the human voice: "Recite from the Koran as many verses as you are able" (Q 73:20) . 80 Ibn Ḥazm specifĳies: "It is the information grasped from that voice which is called Qurʾān, and it is truly the Word of God (wa-yusammā al-mafhūmu min dhālika al-ṣawti qurʾānan wa-kalām Allāh taʿālā ʿalā l-ḥaqīqa). Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 2, p. 14. Elsewhere, he specifĳies that the information can be anything mentioned in the Qurʾān. For instance, when we interpret Qurʾānic verses on almsgiving (zakāt), prayers, and the pilgrimage to Mecca etc., we tend to say "This is the Word of God." Ibid., vol. 2, p. 14.
81 Ibn Ḥazm uses here the various expressions denoting the copy of the Qurʾān, thus laying a double emphasis on his claim that Qurʾān equals kalām Allāh, and that various expressions can be used for one meaning, and he says: "The Book of God (kitāb Allāh) is the Qurʾān according to the consensus of the Nation. The Messenger of God had given the name Qurʾān to the copy of the Qurʾān (muṣḥaf), and the Qurʾān is the Word of God, so the muṣḥaf is truly the Word of God and not metaphorically. " Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 2, p. 15. 82 That the Word of God resides in the human heart is made explicit in a Qurʾānic verse: "Here are Signs, Self evident in the hearts of those endowed with knowledge" (Q 29:49) . This is ʿAbdullah Yūsuf ʿAlī's translation, which is more coherent in this case than Arberry's Ḥazm, that the muṣḥaf is nothing but parchments made of animal skins. He even specifĳies the ingredients of ink (gum, vitriol, iron gall and water), to prove that what we hold in our hands is indeed created, although we call it the Qurʾān, which is, as previously stated, God's speech.85 Ibn Ḥazm's view is obviously pragmatic, as he wishes to dedicate the formula "God's speech is uncreated" solely to the fĳifth manifestation of the Qurʾān. His argumentation is based on common sense on the one hand, and on the common use of the language, on the other. The linguistic argument is elaborated towards the end of the chapter. Ibn Ḥazm's solution is to describe the Qurʾān by the traditionalist formula of "neither a creator nor created" (lā khāliq wa-lā makhlūq):86
Since the name Qurʾān applies equally and truly to fĳive diffferent things, from which four are created and one is uncreated, no one is allowed to say that the Qurʾān is created or that God's speech is created.87
The distinction Ibn Ḥazm makes between the temporal manifestations of the Qurʾān and the Qurʾān as the uncreated Word of God and His Knowledge has one practical implication, and that is the issue of oaths. There are several ḥadīths, including one on the authority of the Prophet himself, which refer to swearing by the Qurʾān as an unbreakable oath. However, none of them clarifĳies what they mean by "Qurʾān," a point that Ibn Ḥazm explains:
Whoever takes an oath and swears by the Qurʾān or by the Word of God, but deep inside he means the copy of the Qurʾān, or the reciting voice [of the Qurʾān], which one can hear, or the [text] as remembered by heart, what he says is not considered to be an oath (yamīn). If he does not mean all the above, but unrestrictedly means the Qurʾān, then it is an oath. In case he breaks it, he is obliged to make atonement. The reason is that the speech of God is His knowledge.88
One may fĳind a repercussion of Ibn Ḥazm's pragmatic view of the Qurʾān and its temporal manifestations in another issue, which is the issue of 85 Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 2, p. 16. 86 Ibid, p. 19 . For the formula lā khāliq wa-lā makhlūq, see al- Ājurrī, p. 83 and Madelung, "Controversy, " p. 508. 87 Ibn Ḥazm Faṣl, vol. 2, p. 17 . As an example, Ibn Ḥazm explains that when you have fĳive garments, four of which are red and the fĳifth is not red, then the only option of describing this garment is to say that it is not red. Saying that it is red is obviously a lie. The analogy to his theory is clear, and it is an attack on the Muʿtazila for having claimed that the word of God is created. Ibn Ḥazm, Faṣl, vol. 2, p. 18. 88 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 8, p. 33 (query 1129) .
© 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-23424-6 touching the Qurʾān and reading it by a man in a state of major ritual impurity (junb) or a menstruating woman (ḥāʾiḍ). Ibn Ḥazm allows it, after examining all the opinions against it. Once having ruled that there is no textual evidence forbidding the ritually impure to touch the Qurʾān, he refers to the opinion of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767), who allowed the ritually impure to carry the Qurʾān in a saddle bag (khurj). Ibn Ḥazm here gives an opinion that implies what the Qurʾān is, in his eyes. The material from which the Qurʾān is made, is obviously not the Qurʾān. The temporal Qurʾān is, then, an object which contains the one uncreated Qurʾān:
If the saddle bag separates between the Qurʾān and the man who carries it, then the shoulder-blade and the sheets of paper separate between the man who touches them and the Qurʾān. There is no diffference.89
Turning now to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya and his poem, he does not mention one of the created manifestations of the Qurʾān, that of the content of the Revelation (stories about ancient peoples, laws, warnings, etc.), but he maintains the core of Ibn Ḥazm's argument and eventually provides an accurate account of it. This is how he interprets Ibn Ḥazm's view:
After that came Ibn Ḥazm and said: the people have neither one Qurʾān nor two, But four, all of which are called Qurʾān. This saying is evidently false.
There is the one we recite, and another, put down in writing, which is called the Uthmanic Codex (al-muṣḥaf al-ʿuthmānī). The third one is kept in our hearts. All three are God's creation. The fourth is an eternal entity (al-maʿnā al-qadīm) like His knowledge. All these are called Qurʾān. But I do believe that he (i.e. Ibn Ḥazm) was looking for something, for which he had not found an accurate phrase.
[Every] specifĳic [thing] has four degrees [of existence], all of which are comprehensible and well known to every man.
[A degree of existence] in the eye, in the mind, the uttered word, and the written one, which your fĳingers put down. To all of which the name is correctly applied, yet the most deserving to have this name is that which is situated in the entities.90 89 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 1, , at p. 84. Ibn Taymiyya refers to Ibn Ḥazm's opinion in a comprehensive fatwā on purity. Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-fatāwā, vol. 1, p. 341. On the basis of a Prophetic ḥadīth, which states "Only the pure can touch the Qurʾān," Ibn Taymiyya rejects Ibn Ḥazm's view. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 357 . A useful survey on the subject is Fierro, "En manos de fĳieles e infĳieles," p. 209. I thank the author for providing me with a copy of her article. 90 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, al-Kāfĳiya al-shāfĳiya (1996) The thing is but one thing, not four. A meager ability to diffferentiate between things is what befell Ibn Ḥazm.91 God has told us that He speaks through the Revelation and the Qurʾān. He also has informed us that His Word is preserved in the hearts of those who have both knowledge and faith. He also has informed us that His Word is in 'purifĳied pages'92 [which came] from the Merciful. He has also informed us that His Word is both read and recited, when the human recites it. It is all but one thing, not four and three and two. 93 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya here strives to separate between human actions (reading, reciting, writing and memorizing) and between the Qurʾān, to which all of these human actions apply. This separation allows him to establish one concept, divided into two parts: there is one Qurʾān; the Qurʾānic text has several degrees of existence which are the products of human actions: the recited Qurʾān is one degree which is the product of the human recitation, the written Qurʾān is another degree which is the product of the human writing, and so on. This view is summed up in the following verses:
Reciting the Qurʾān is our action, and so is writing [it] with our fĳingers. But what is recited, written or kept in one's heart, is the Word of the One, the Benefactor. The human being can recite it in a pleasant voice, but also in a not so pleasant one. At any rate, both voices are the human's. Al-Subkī paraphrases Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's versifĳication more or less accurately: "Ibn Ḥazm came, and said: The people have neither one Qurʾān nor two, but four. This saying is evidently false. There is the recited one, the written one and the one which is kept [in the hearts], and the eternal entity (al-maʿnā al-qadīm). Thus Ibn Ḥazm was a misfortune befalling on the Muslim community." Al-Subkī, Sayf, p. 75. I thank Gino Schallenbergh for sending me a copy of al-Sayf al-ṣaqīl.
92 "Purifĳied pages" is an allusion to "it is a Reminder (and whoso wills, shall remember it) upon pages high-honored, uplifted, purifĳied." (Q 80:11-14) 93 Al-Kāfĳiya al-shāfĳiya (1996 ), pp. 81-82, verses 758-63. © 2013 He can also write the Qurʾān in fĳine calligraphy, and not so fĳine. At any rate, both calligraphies are the human's. As for our voices, our ink, our writing material, and the parchment, and also [our] writing the Qurʾān, They are all created. But His Word, which is recited, is not created. These are two diffferent things.94
Ibn Qayyim's critique is meant to identify a possible solution of setting an accurate terminology, which enables Ibn Ḥazm's theory to merge into the Jawziyyan discourse. This "degrees of existence" solution enables him to defĳine the createdness of the temporal manifestations of the Qurʾān without actually defĳining them as created. The solution suggested by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya in al-Kāfĳiya al-shāfĳiya was fĳirst applied by Ibn Taymiyya in his attack on extremists, whom he calls "the chicks of the Lafẓiyya" (furūkh al-lafẓiyya). Those extremists apparently sacralized the copies of the Qurʾān and their voices, while reciting the Qurʾān, elevating them to the degree of the divine attribute of God's Word.95 In order to demonstrate the diffference between the copy of the Qurʾān one can hold in his hand, and the Word of God, Ibn Taymiyya says: "Every thing has four degrees of existence: an existence in the entities (aʿyān), an existence in the minds (adhhān), an existence in the tongue (lisān) and an existence in the fĳingers (binān), or in other words, an actual existence (wujūd ʿaynī), an intellectual existence (wujūd ʿilmī), an existence in the uttered words (wujūd lafẓī) and an existence in the written words (wujūd rasmī)."96 When Ibn Taymiyya applies this terminology to the diffferent temporal manifestations of the Qurʾān, however, he is very cautious not to say, as Ibn Ḥazm did, that "the name Qurʾān applies equally and truly to fĳive diffferent things, from which four are created and one is uncreated,"97 although his (and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's) "degrees of existence" terminology Given the fact that Ibn al-Qayyim adopted the essence of Ibn Ḥazm's claim, this reproach is hardly justifĳied, and again underlines the intensity of emotions that Ibn Ḥazm aroused in Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya.
Ḥijjat al-wadāʿ
Ibn Ḥazm's fundamental approach to the two main sources of law, the Qurʾān and ḥadīth, denies any possibility of an inner contradiction in the sacred texts. In fact, claims Ibn Ḥazm, two Qurʾānic verses cannot contradict each other, a Qurʾānic verse cannot contradict a reliable ḥadīth, and two reliable ḥadīths cannot contradict one another. If a layman or a pretentious scholar ignorantly identifĳies such a contradiction, then it is the duty of the Muslim to follow whatever these texts order or suggest, "because neither text is more deserving to be applied than the other, and neither ḥadīth is more obligating than the other."99 This approach is fully applied in Ḥijjat al-wadāʿ, which is an illuminating example of Ibn Ḥazm's treatment of ḥadīths, although not in order to establish the Islamic law, but in order to reconstruct a historical narrative.
In his introduction to Ḥijjat al-wadāʿ, Ibn Ḥazm declares that people have despaired from studying the ḥadīths on Muḥammad's Farewell Pilgrimage to Mecca, because the numerous variations of these accounts often 98 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, al-Kāfĳiya al-shāfĳiya (1996 ), pp. 82-83, verses 774-78. 99 Ibn Ḥazm, Iḥkām, vol 2, p. 21. © 2013 seem to be contradicting.100 When taking upon himself the task of sorting out these accounts, and depicting the actual route of Muḥammad's pilgrimage and his deeds at every stop along the way, Ibn Ḥazm discovered, so he claims, that the apparently contradicting texts are actually compatible and complement each other. Unlike the conventional general opinion about these accounts, Ibn Ḥazm found them "coherent (munsarida), well connected to each other and clear in both their content and style."101
In Ḥijjat al-wadāʿ Ibn Ḥazm aims at unifying the discourse on the Farewell Pilgrimage and producing a coherent narrative based on authenticated ḥadīths only, whose chain of transmitters ends either with the Prophet himself or with a ṣaḥābī eye-witness. This narrative is presented in the fĳirst chapter (al-faṣl al-awwal) , which reveals every action of the Prophet from the moment he announced to the people of Medina his intention to make the Pilgrimage, until his return to Medina. In order to produce coherency and fluency, Ibn Ḥazm omits the chains of transmitters and even the direct transmitters of these accounts, and he retells these stories. From the second chapter onward, Ibn Ḥazm deals with specifĳic details of the narrative he constructs. He identifĳies ḥadīths considered by others to be disputable; however he clarifĳies them, and shows that they do not contradict each other, but in fact fĳit nicely in the coherent narrative he toils to reconstruct.
Ibn Ḥazm indeed succeeded in weaving a coherent narrative of the Prophet's Farewell Pilgrimage, but failed, according to his own admission, in fĳiguring out the case of the Prophet's prayer on the Day of Immolation (yawm al-naḥr) . He admits that he could not determine whether the Prophet performed this prayer in Minā or Mecca. "Perhaps a clarifĳication of [this point] will be revealed to someone else," he adds modestly, "I hope that whoever fĳigures out some day the things that were difffĳicult for me, will add them to what I have already assembled here, thus enabling me to be granted with a great recompense from God."102 The modest tone Ibn Ḥazm uses could either be read as a stylistic convention or as a façade covering his pride in his innovative and pioneering work. His apology, then, should probably be read as challenging all his successors to try and rip out the seams of his work. 100 Ibn Ḥazm, Ḥijja, s Ḥijjat al-wadāʿ has been systematically analyzed and translated by Camilla Adang ("The Prophet's Farewell Pilgrimage"). Her article came to my attention only after the completion of the present paper. 101 Ibn Ḥazm, Ḥijja, p. 44. 102 Ibn Ḥazm, Ḥijja, p. 44. © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-23424-6
Three centuries later, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya accepts this challenge. He is not satisfĳied with merely checking the unsolved case of the prayer on the Day of Immolation, but systematically examines Ibn Ḥazm's narrative, sometimes accepting, sometimes rejecting it. He does that in his fĳinal work, Zād al-maʿād fī hady khayr al-ʿibād, which is an ambitious attempt to retell the sīra of the Prophet.103 Like Ibn Ḥazm, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya toils to reconstruct a coherent narrative from the numerous versions scattered in the ḥadīth material. Having Ibn Ḥazm's Ḥijjat al-wadāʿ in front of him, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya analyzes the latter's argumentations, and even tries to provide possible explanations for Ibn Ḥazm's suggested solutions.
Zād al-maʿād is a mature work, penned by a scholar confĳident in his vast knowledge of ḥadīth and bold in his interpretation. The lion's share of it has been so far neglected, since it has not drawn scholarly attention, apart from its last section, which deals with al-ṭibb al-nabawī.104 Ibn Qayyim alJawziyya's systematic examination of Ibn Ḥazm's Ḥijjat al-wadāʿ is a truly independent scholarly endeavour, which was not inspired by Ibn Taymiyya in any way, although Ibn Taymiyya was quite familiar with the work and even described it as "a good book" (kitāb jayyid).105 We will examine one representative case from Zād al-maʿād, in which Ibn al-Qayyim tries to defeat Ibn Ḥazm, using the Ḥazmian method of establishing a coherent line of narrative from diffferent and sometimes contradicting ḥadīths. The case in question is the date of the Prophet's departure from Medina to Mecca, a case which apparently no scholar before Ibn Ḥazm tried to decipher.106
There are basically two authenticated ḥadīths connected to this case, but neither indicates the specifĳic day of departure. The fĳirst ḥadīth, on the authority of ʿĀʾisha (d. 58/678) This version does not state wherefrom they departed. Moreover, although the phrase li-khams baqīna min is usually taken for "fĳive days before the end of [the month]," which is the 25th of a month of thirty days, it can also be taken for "fĳive nights before the end of [the month]," which actually means the 24th of a month of thirty days. This point, as we shall see, is crucial for Ibn Ḥazm's argument and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's attempt to rebut it.
The second ḥadīth, on the authority of Ibn ʿAbbās, can also be interpreted in diffferent ways:
The Prophet left Medina after he combed his hair, anointed, and put on his waist-wrapper and shirt, for he had not prohibited wearing waist-wrappers and shirts, apart from those which are safffron-dyed, because they stain the skin. And so in the morning he awoke in Dhū l-Ḥulayfa (a place with a well, situated six miles from Medina). He rode his she-camel, directing himself to al-Baydāʾ (a plain near Medina, on the road to Mecca). That was fĳive [days or nights] Ṣaḥīḥ, vol. 1, pp. 521, bāb 115 and bāb 124) . Ibn Ḥazm, Ḥijja, p. 156; Zād, vol. 1, p. 306 Turning now to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, it is evident that he is deeply afffected by Ibn Ḥazm's methods and argumentation, although his fundamental stance allows the existence of "minor discrepancies" (ikhtilāf yasīr) in ḥadīths addressing the same subject. When dealing with another matter relating to the Farewell Pilgrimage, both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn alQayyim declare that the companions' reports are in complete agreement with each other, apart from minor discrepancies which also occur here and there in other ḥadīths on various matters.117
In the case of establishing the exact day on which the Prophet left Medina, however, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya does not see any contradiction among the various texts. However, he arrives at a solution that is not too straightforward; in fact, it is quite bewildering. His solution is based on a calculation that regards the month of Dhū l-Qaʿda not as a "complete" month of 30 days, but as a "defective" month of 29 days.
Unlike his usual systematic way of proving his points, Ibn al-Qayyim does not excel in refuting Ibn Ḥazm's arguments, mainly because he deals with these arguments in two diffferent sections of his book: in a chapter in which he describes the events of the Farewell Pilgrimage, and much later in a chapter entitled "Regarding erroneous claims" (fī l-awhām), in © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-23424-6 which he enlists a variety of incorrect facts about this pilgrimage, gathered from the writings of Ibn Ḥazm and others, like Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Ṭabarī (d. 694/1295) . 118 An example of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's inconsistency is the account, on the authority of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, according to which the Day of ʿArafa in the Farewell Pilgrimage was a Friday. This is indeed Ibn Ḥazm's most important textual evidence, on which he bases his proposed timeline. In his attempt to make Ibn Ḥazm's timeline collapse, Ibn al-Qayyim ignores this account altogether. In fact, elsewhere Ibn Qayyim indicates that the Prophet spent Friday night in Minā, the valley near Mecca, and at dawn of the next day set offf for ʿArafa.119 Nevertheless, it is evident that Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya shares Ibn Ḥazm's view, that the Day of ʿArafa was a Friday. 120 In the fĳirst chapter of Zād al-Maʿād he provides textual evidence for that. In this chapter, discussing some aspects of cosmology, he refers to Friday as the best day of the week, and the Day of ʿArafa as the best day of the year (any year). When the Day of ʿArafa falls on a Friday, the rite of standing (wuqūf, waqfa) in the plain of ʿArafa has a special blessing, "because it coincides with the day on which the Prophet had stood."121 This is the day in which God perfected His religion for all worshipers, says Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, quoting Q 5:3: "Today I have perfected your religion for you, and I have completed My blessing upon you, and I have approved Islam for your religion." This verse is set in the same ḥadīth, also quoted by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, in which ʿUmar said: "I know the day and the place © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-23424-6 in Dhū l-Qaʿda. Using the same ḥadīths that Ibn Ḥazm used, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya offfers a diffferent timeline. The above table is based on his suggestion.
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's timeline starts on a Friday, while Ibn Ḥazm's timeline starts on a Thursday. The two timelines are incompatible in reference to the 11th month, which is Dhū l-Qaʿda. But in the 12th month, Dhū l-Ḥijja, the timelines suggested by both scholars are identical. The only way to achieve this is, as Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya does, to take the 11th month as a "defective" month of 29 days. This solution is quite farfetched, because it is customary that odd months, like Dhū l-Qaʿda, are "complete" months of 30 days, while even months, like Dhū l-Ḥijja are "defective" months of 29 days. Following his rationale and calculations, then, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya arrives at this solution independently, apparently without drawing inspiration from any known source, apart from Ibn Ḥazm's attempt to reconcile the contradictory ḥadīths.128 That Ibn Ḥazm is Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's only source of inspiration is obvious from the lengthy explanation the latter gives to his proposed solution. He sincerely tries to understand how Ibn Ḥazm arrived at his timeline, and concludes, that it was a misunderstanding on Ibn Ḥazm's part. Ibn al-Qayyim explains that when reading li-khams baqīna min Dhī l-Qaʿda, Ibn Ḥazm took the cardinal number khams (fĳive) as denoting a feminine noun. Since yawm (day) is masculine, he decided that the number here refers to layla (night), which is a feminine noun. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's elaboration on this point provides the best example for his understanding Ibn Ḥazm's calculations and considerations:
He (i.e. Ibn Ḥazm) took it as fĳive nights left before the end of the month, which is only possible if the day of departure is a Friday. Because if the day of departure was a Saturday, it would have been four nights before the end of the month and this turns his argumentation against him. If the day of departure was a Thursday, it would not have been fĳive nights before the end of the month, but six nights. That is what compelled him to attribute the departure in the above-mentioned date to Dhū l-Ḥulayfa. However, this is hardly needed, since it is possible that Dhū l-Qaʿda was incomplete (idh min al-mumkin an yakūna shahru Dhī l-Qaʿda kāna nāqiṣan). 129 The last sentence is meant to come to Ibn Ḥazm's rescue and to give him an exit from his misreading.
Which of the two scholars was correct? Was the 24th of Dhū l-Qaʿda a Thursday, as Ibn Ḥazm claims, or a Friday, as Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya claims? Was Dhū l-Qaʿda indeed a month of 29 days? According to the conventional date converters, the 24th of Dhū l-Qaʿda in the year 10 ah was a Friday. Also, Dhū l-Qaʿda that year was indeed a month of 30 days.130 In which case, Ibn Ḥazm is correct in his calculations. Ibn Qayyim alJawziyya's bold attempt seemed to be smashed on the rocks of Ibn Ḥazm's ingenuity and thorough scholarship. Still, it is quite an impressive attempt. Ignoring here any modern means of calculating, both scholars seem © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-23424-6 convincing in their argumentations. A nice example for this is the stances taken by Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373) . In one of his sīra works, he adopts the timeline of Ibn Ḥazm,131 while in a chapter dedicated to the Farewell Pilgrimage in his monumental al-Bidāya wal-nihāya he adopts Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's solution after attacking Ibn Ḥazm's view.132 Obviously, even Ibn Kathīr could not decide who was correct.
Zād al-maʿād, which is abundant in examples of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's debt to Ibn Ḥazm, should be read simultaneously with Ḥijjat al-wadāʿ. This parallel reading demonstrates both scholars' extreme effforts to draw information from what seem to be scattered and incoherent historical evidence, and recreate a vivid and accurate picture of the past.
Conclusion
Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya were familiar with the literary output of Ibn Ḥazm, and both are indebted to him, and especially to his magnum opus, al-Faṣl fī l-milal wa-l-niḥal, which they constantly consulted and to which they referred many a time in their writings. Still, Ibn Ḥazm's contribution to Ibn Taymiyya was limited. Occasionally quoting Ibn Ḥazm and refuting his controversial opinions, the innovative and brilliant Ibn Taymiyya did not study Ibn Ḥazm systematically as he did Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.133 In Ibn Taymiyya's eyes, Ibn Ḥazm is one of several prominent scholars, but by no means the most important one, whose teachings should be dealt with cautiously.
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's case is quite diffferent. As a humble scholar, whose intellectual output is dedicated to interpreting Ibn Taymiyya's writings, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya seems to have found exciting new topics to explore in Ibn Ḥazm's writings. His thirst for love, beauty and poetry was undoubtedly refreshed by Ibn Ḥazm's exquisite Ṭawq al-ḥamāma. No doubt al-Faṣl was important to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya at the beginning of his writing career, as it served as a basis for his fĳirst mature monograph, Kitāb al-Rūḥ. In his old age, writing his masterpiece Zād al-maʿād, he takes 131 Ibn Kathīr, Fuṣūl, p. 216. 132 Ibn Kathīr, Bidāya, vol. 5, p. 107. As noted above in n. , the chapter on the Farewell Pilgrimage was also published separately as an independent work: the editor adds in a footnote that Ibn Kathīr's view is identical to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's treatment on the subject as it appears in Zād al-maʿād. Ibn Kathīr, at Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's humility as a scholar enables him to systematically and patiently read Ibn Ḥazm, an endeavor that Ibn Taymiyya never undertook. It is Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's business to understand exactly how Ibn Ḥazm reached this conclusion or the other. He speculates on Ibn Ḥazm's readings, as though he is conversing and arguing with him. When he refutes Ibn Ḥazm in very emotional language, it is clear that as much as Ibn Ḥazm's controversial opinions make him angry, they are nevertheless stimulating and challenging. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's thoroughness dictates a method of citation-refutation of the Ḥazmian text. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's literal creativity molds his "dialogue" with Ibn Ḥazm vividly and enthusiastically.
Ibn Ḥazm enriched the Jawziyyan hermeneutics and enabled Ibn alQayyim to develop his original ideas and vocabulary, as is reflected in one of the latter's later works, Tuḥfat al-mawdūd. It seems that under the guise of rejection, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya willingly accepted Ibn Ḥazm's methodology, and sometimes his opinions.
